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Only two days after my arrival in Washington I am grate-
ful for this chance of addressing such a distinguished American 
audience. I come in fulfilment of an ancient Chinese curse~"may 
you live in interesting times". The times are interesting. The 
times are also hard. Particularly for trade relations between 
Europe and the United States. A variety of metaphors have been 
used over the last few weeks to describe the state of these rela-
tions. I shall abstain today from adding any more. But what is 
clear is that relations across the Atlantic are going through the 
roughest patch in living memory. So let me take a few minutes of 
your time today and look, as a European, at the nature and the scale 
of these differences and try to put them in some general context. 
These differences need in fact to be seen against a very 
wide backcloth, partly political, partly economic. 
Relations with the Soviet Union, the stability of the 
Middle East, our relations with the developing countries, macro-
economic questions such as the level of interest rates, are only some 
examples. 
And, in the mind of European governments, the dramatic and 
rising level of unemployment - the worst since the 1930s - is a 
constant and major preoccupation. 
But, in the interest ofbrevity, and since the Commission 
of the European communities has a particular interest in trade 
since it represents in this area its Member States in dealings 






Many of you-particularly from the u.s. steel industry-
might think the steel issue an open-and-shut case. Here is the 
United States steel industry going through one of the worst periods 
in its history. Here are these cunning foreigners subsidizing their 
steel exports to the United States and dumping left and right. lvhat 
then have Europeans got to complain about if action in accordance 
with the due process of U.S. law is taken to stop these illegal and 
damaging acts·? 
Let me make three basic points. And let me begin with 
subsidies. In 1977 we- the u.s., the E.E.C. and others- agreed 
in what was called the OECD Consensus that we should cooperate in a 
multilateral framework and that the burden of restructuring steel on 
both sides of the Atlantic should not be shifted onto others. We both 
had problems - out of date planm, inadequate investment and high labour 
costs. But we agreed not to try and export problems on one side of 
the Atlantic to the other. 
We in the Community think that we have kept our side of the 
bargain. Over the last six years the work force in the Community 
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steel industry has been reduced by one-third - by some 230,000 jobs. 
And under a Commission decision of August 1981 Member State aids to 
the steel sector are strictly prohibited unless they are geared to 
a reduction in capacity; no, repeat no, aids will be permitted after 
1985. These decisions were not easy. But they were taken and will 
be carried through. 
The second point relates to the determination of anti-dumping 
and subsidies. How are these calculated? We contest here a whole 
number of points. Let me give simply two examples. In the case of 
anti-dumping, a notional - some may say mythical - profit margin of 8 
percent is automatiqally included in the u.s. calculations. If any 
of you are earning 8 percent on your capital in these hard times you 
can count yourself lUcky. And any loan to a so-called uncreditworthy 
company is counted a subsidy. Some of you are in the pension fund 
business. So some of you have shares in U.S. Steel. What matters in 
the long haul is the long term outlook, not an arbitrary automatic 
rule at any point in time. So we are contesting these interpretations 
in the GATT. And it is worth recalling that if we win our case, say 
on subsidies, the GATT rules provide that counter measures against the 
United States could be authorised. 
And this leads to a general point. Not everything in the 
GATT is agreed down to the last comma. It simply was not possible to 
negotiate as far. So it is not a good thing in the mutual interest 
for partners who have to trade with each other to make unilateral in-
terpretations of grey areas in the GATT rules. 
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A third point is that finding irrports are subsidized - or d~ -
is not enough. There is nothing in the international trade rules 
against these practices as such. A British business friend of mine 
was once asked if he was dumping overseas. He became indignant. 
He was not dumping, he said. He was exporting at a loss in the 
national interest. What the GATT rules provide is that action can 
be taken against subsidized or dumped imports if they cause injury. 
And this judgement has to be internationally acceptable. Now the 
difficulties of the United States steel industry are well known. 
They are not, as I indicated earlier, unique to the United States. 
But we do not think that imports of Community steel amounting in 
the years 1979 - 1981 to just over 5% of the United States market 
can reasonably be held to be a significant reason for the admittedly 
very serious problems of the U.S. industry - not unlike those faced 
by our own industry. 
This formed some of the background to the long and difficult 
discussions in which we agreed with the u.s. Administration on August 6 
ona limitation of Community steel exports in certain categories which 
would in return have provided for the withdrawal of countervailing and 
anti-dumping suits by U.S. industry. We were fvankly disappointed 
that the United States steel industry does not seem to find these 
proposals attractive. The agreement would provide for peace in the 
valley for the next three years and would do a lot to stabilise 
confidence in investment. If the agreement is not implemented, a 
substantial part of the five million tonnes imported on average over 
the last three years from the Community will be at stake, and if 
European industry, which has lost a third of its work force and is 
going through its most difficult time since the War, has to face 
the prospect of losing a substantial part of its exports to the 
United States, then clearly a very serious situation would arise. 
Then the pipeline. A lot has been written about this. 
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Some of our views have come across. I hope as in the case of steel 
that we can explore the possibilities of a solution. And we welcome 
some encouraging signs in this direction. But in default of a solu-
tion - and since the argument in the press is still going on, let me 
try and summarize as reasonably and as clearly as I can the European 
view. 
And since in this country one can have a rational dialogue, 
let me begin by asking a few questions. 
My first question is whether it is really thought here that 
the decision of the Department of Commerce on 22 June to prohibit 
export of goods and technology on oil and gas is compatible with in-
ternational law. I know that the niceties of international law do 
not always play to a full house. But the United States have long had 
the reputation internationally of being a law-abiding country. And 
being on the right side of the law not only produces that inner tran-
quillity which only the good Lord or a visit to Abercrombie and Fitch 
can provide. It is also good for business. Now we think that this 
decision is not compatible with international law. We take exception 
in particular to its extra territorial and retroactive nature. We 
set our detailed views on this question in a memorandum which we gave 
to the Department of Commerce in early August. I will spare you now 
the details. But a copy is available here today for anyone who would 
like to see our argumentation. 
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My second question is this. Supposing that the situation 
were reversed. Let us suppose that a European Government or the 
Community were to say to the United States: "you have got your trading 
relationship with a certain major country completely wrong. We 
thoroughly disapprove of how you are conducting your relations. And 
we are therefore ordering all European firms which have any dealings 
with the United States over an important range of high technology to 
cut off their supply of knowhow and goods". Coming from a country 
which lost a lot of tea in Boston Harbour years ago, I could make 
some guess at the reactions. But it is a question more for you than 
for me. 
My next question relates to the export of high technology. 
What do you think the results of this decision will be on the United 
States exports in this field of critical and growing importance? 
How will the increasing and very valuable trend to joint ventures be 
affected/ You will have seen an estimate by the Department of Commerce 
of a cost to U.S. companies over the next three years of up to 
$600 million in exports and an additional loss for licensees of 
$1.6 billion. The United States Trade Representative, Bill 
Brock, has asked that the meeting of the GATT Ministers planned for 
November in Geneva should launch a study of international trade in 
high technology. Given the growing importance this sector will 
assume over the next few decades, this move is understandable. But 
I hope you will not accuse me of an excess of European logic if I 
say that to have the right hand put something on the table for exam-
ination while in a smooth conjuror-like movement the left hand removes ~ 
it is to say the least somewhat confusing. And this is not of course 
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simply a question of the short term.Foreign buyers will be reluctant 
to sign up and pay for transfers of technology with what they are 
bound now to consider an unreliable partner. 
My fourth question relates to exports of grain. A question 
was put to a high U.S. official in Brussels at a press conference 
this summer about the effect on the Soviet Union of a limitation of 
U.S. grain exports. If this were to happen, the questioner asked, 
would not the world price be bound to rise with the result that a sum 
not far removed from the 10 billion dollars from the pipeline which 
the Soviets hope to get annually in some years time could be extracted 
from them tomorrow? Particularly given the very dominant position of 
the U.S. in world grain trade and the very large Soviet demand following 
a fourth grain crop failure. Of course1 limiting U.S. grain exports 
is a difficult proposition. However, it is no easier to tolerate a 
situation where thousand of skilled European workers are turned out 
on the streets - in a Community with unemployment already rising towards 
11 million - on the instructions of a government thousands of miles 
away. 
In fact, let me say that we view this issue, with due apologies 
to Charles Dickens, as the Tale of the Two Pipelines. In pictorial 
form - I speak as an admirer of Herblock - there would be two pipe-
lines. one would begin in Iowa and end in Moscow. 
For the second pipeline you have to go to a field in Western 
Europe where a pipeline half finishes and half doesn't, like the smile 
on the Cheshire Cat. In other words it is still to be built. And by 
it stands a huge placard with the following inscription: 
Everyone knows 
that grain is fungible 
but dealing in gas 
is for those 
who are gullible. 
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There are some additional points. It is argued that the 
pipeline would dangerously increase Western Europe's dependence on 
the Soviet Union. 
But even when this gas is flowing at a maximum rate in 
1990, it will represent less than 4 percent of the Community's total 
energy consumption. Would you have us instead increase our dependence 
on such suppliers as Iran? There is not much evidence that they would 
be more dependable. 
Again it is argued that without the Department of Commerce 
decision high technology would flow dangerously to the Soviet Union. 
But this decision will give the Soviets a strong inducement to enlarge 
their own manufacturing capacity and to accelerate their own turbine 
and c::orrpressor developments, thus becoming independent of Western sources. 
Do you think the country which put the sputnik into space is incapable 
of this? In the meantime the pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe 
will be built. The Soviets will simply divert technology and produc-
tion capacity from other parts of their current program. 
Mr. Ambassador, if I have been frank about our doubts, it is not 
because we wish to carp or criticize for the sake of it. It is rather 
a tribute to a relationship between friends and allies that we can both 
afford to lay our views on the line. Equally we understand that the 
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decision of the U.S. Administration was one of principle. And views 
of principle held between friends and allies deserve a careful hearing 
and careful discussion. But here there was no prior discussion. And 
we do honestly think that the decision has some major drawbacks. It 
will 
- boost Soviet technology; 
- damage U.S. business; 
- damage European business; 
- not prevent the pipeline from being built; 
- and not fulfil a major U.S. aim - which could 
be achieved by other means - of limiting Soviet 
foreign currency spending on technology and 
hardware. 
And the decision has, as we all know, caused disarray in 
the Western Alliance. The Soviets are not displeased, I believe. 
And it is open to doubt how much all this will really help the Poles. 
Let me turn to another crisis area - agriculture. Now here 
we should be clear from the outset that there can be no reasonable 
charge that the Community is a protectionist bloc. The E.E.C. remains 
the biggest importer of agricultural imports and we had a trade deficit 
in agriculture in 1980 of nearly 29 billion dollars. The trade deficit 
of the E.E.C. in agriculture with the u.s. increased in fact from 
5.8 billion dollars in 1979 to 6.8. billion dollars in 1980. That was 
an increase of 17%,and in the first nine months of 1981 it continued 
to increase by 13%. 
Most of the argument between us is not about imports into 
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the E.C. It is about exports from the E.E.C. to third markets. And 
here there is a basic difference of perception. Your authorities 
say agricultural subsidies are bad and must be removed. We say that 
this is not what the international trading rules provide. The agree-
ment come to after long and difficult negotiations in the Tokyo Round 
in 1979 confirmed and elaborated a long standing rule that agricultural 
subsidies are permitted providing that these did not lead to any Member 
of the GATT obtaining more than an equitable share of world trade. 
How has this worked out? First we are not the only ones who 
give government aid to our farmers. In our view if you compare like 
with like, farm spending in the E.E.C. per farmer is not far off what 
it is in the u.s. 
Having said this, what has happened then to our share of 
world trade? Let me give an example. There have been complaints 
that "subsidies have helped to push E.C. wheat exports to 14 million 
tons, double their wheat exports three years ago, with a depressing 
effect on world prices". Yes, it is true that Community exports 
doubled between 1969-70 and 1980-81 to 14 million tons. But world 
trade was expanding even more rapidly. Our share actually fell from 
16.6% to 14.9% over this period. What happened to u.s. exports? 
They did not just double. They more than doubled. They rose from 
16.5 million tons to no less than 41.9 million tons - from 38.4% of 
world trade to no less than 44.8% of the world market. Indeed, 
thirteen years ago the United States exported 40% of their production -
now this amounts to between 60 and 70%. 
Let me put it another way. After the hard fought agreement 
11 
we reached in the Tokyo Round about 11 an equitable share of the world 
market 11 can we in Brussels go back to our farmers when the world 
market for a certain product is doubling or trebling and say to them 
that they cannot increase their exports because this might inconvenience 
farmers elsewhere? 
Let us talk not only about the past. For the future the 
E.E.C. intends to continue and intensify its efforts to rationalize 
its agriculture. Our underlying aim domestically is to put more and 
more responsibility on farmers themselves to dispose of surpluses1 
especially by making the farmers contribute to the cost of surplus 
disposal. Not that we consider an excess of domestic production over 
domestic consumption necessarily a surplus that must be eliminated. 
The E.E.C. intends to keep its place in world trade. But we consider 
that for some products the European Community's price guarantees to 
its farmers should be limited. We have taken steps to this e.nd for 
sugar and in part for milk products. And for cereals we intend to 
fix 11 production thresholds 11 in terms of quantity for our cereals for 
the 1980s. This means that if the threshold is exceeded then in the 
following year, the level of support will be diminished. All this 
means that farmers' incomes1 which have fallen in real terms in recent 
years,will be further affected. 
And we can alsc say, not in any spirit of criticism, that 
people who live in houses with large windows should be carefu~. about 
throwing stones. You have a system of support for dairy products 
which limits imports to 1% of domestic consumption, and you have 
recently imposed restrictions on imports of sugar. 
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So much for some elements of the record and some guidelines 
for the future. 
But where in practice the argument is concentrating is 
on subsidies in general and particular disputes in the GATT. A state-
ment of U.S. views on the Common Agricultural Policy handed to us 
and widely distributed to Congress in February this year said "E.C. 
export subsidies are the single most harmful of E.C. policies. The 
U.S. must seek an acceptable plan and timetable for their elimination". 
I have already set out what we agreed for agricultural subsidies in 
the Tokyo Round. This U.S. attitude goes very far beyond it. Nor 
does this seem to square with such systems as DISC. 
Partl~ u.s. policy is reflected in a whole number of separate 
cases brought for adjudication to the GATT by the United States - wheat 
flour, sugar, poultry, pasta, canned fruit, and citrus. You might 
say why not. If there is adjudication in the GATT let it take its 
normal course. But in the first place these cases each require lengthy 
and detailed debate. In the second place this concentration of cases 
is not only unparalleled; it risks blowing the dispute settlement 
process in the GATT and with it the ruLe of law in wor.ld trade just as 
ce~rtainly as overloading with too many bulbs an electric circuit. 
What can one conclude from these three problem areas ? 
It is difficult for a foreigner to avoid two conclusions. 
The first is that there seems to be a tendency to see 
the cause of American difficulties originating abroad. It is in 
the case of U.S. agriculture that this tendency seems strongest 
to us. The deep troubles of U.S. agriculture can be ascribed to 
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a variety of causes: interest rates, growing agricultural surpluses, 
a strengthening dollar and lower prices on the world markets. But 
the Community cannot accept that its farmers do not have a right 
to make a living selling overseas providing they abide by 
international trading rules. 
A second conclusion is that the attitude and tone of 
voice in Washington in foreign trade policy seems a good deal 
more extreme than anything we have seen for a long time. The word 
"aggressive" is frequently used in Administration statements. There 
seems to be a feeling that previous U.S. Administrations have taken 
an attitude of benevolent liberalism, that this has not adequately 
safeguarded U.S. interests and that a new much tougher line with 
foreigners needs to be adopted to defend American interests. I may 
say in passing that I find it difficult to recognize this picture 
of the past. We have dealt over the last two decades with a number 
of prominent U.S. officials in economic affairs. John Connolly, 
Mike Blumenthal and Bob Strauss come to mind. And anyone who thinks 
he could make a quick dollar out of these men believes in unicorns. 
But you will say why should not the United States 
devote itself to a singleminded and aggressive pursuit of its 
own interests internationally ? The world is not exactly full 
of shrinking violets. 
I would suggest three considerations which, in American 
self-interest, should temper this approach. The first is that 
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the traditional picture of an America so rich, so powerful and so 
removed from the outside world that it can easily afford this kind 
of policy has been overtaken by the facts of life. 
For roughly a century -- from the Civil War to the 1960s 
foreign trade accounted for not more than 3-4 percent of United 
States GNP. In the 1970s, there occurred a historical change. In 
1980, the figure was 9 percent. More strikingly, exports accounted 
for about one fifth of the goods produced in the United States. 
Hore than half of U. S. grain is exported. Almost one of every three 
dollars of U.S. corporate profit derives from the international 
trade and investment activities of American firms. And the pace 
of U.S. involvement with the rest of the world in fact is quick-
ening. According to a recent Conference Board report, four out of 
every five manufacturing jobs created in the United States between 
1977 and 1980 were linked to exports. 
And this dependence is especially true of United States 
links with Europe. In 1980, the United States ran a surplus of 
25 billion dollars in its trade with Europe -- nearly 7 billion 
in agricultural goods. So this shows clearly enough that escalating 
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trade restrictions between the United States and the rest of the 
world would be a no win situation. 
The second consideration is a wider one. We can well 
understand as Europeans that an increasing number of Americans 
look today not simply to the Eastern seaboard and to the traditional 
links with Europe, but West to the Pacific. The fact nevertheless 
remains that in international trade the United States and the 
European Community are by far the biggest operators on the world 
stage, accounting between them for something like a third of world 
trade -- nearly half if you take into account trade among the 
countries of the European Community. And this means that the trading 
relationship between Europe and the United States is fundamental 
to the preservation of the open world trading system on which the 
prosperity of the West has depended for the last 35 years. It is 
in no sense to minimize the trading problems elsewhere in the world 
problems with Japan, the fragile financial state of a number of 
major developing countries -- to say that if the shutters come 
clanging down on both sides of the Atlantic then the open world 
trading system is bust. And this is not simply a commercial fact. 
Not simply an economic fact. It is a political fact. Some of you 
remember the days of the bonus marches, of soup kitchens, and 
"brother, can you spare a dime ?". In Europe we had not only soup 
kitchens. We had governments that came to power by torchlight in 
the night. And a collapse of the world trading system means not 
only misery and hardship to an extent not seen for the last fifty 
years, but the risk of a re-visitation of the terrible ghosts 
of the 1930s. 
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There is a tale about the development of the atom bomb 
in Los Alamos in the early 1940s. The search was then on for what 
was called the critical mass -- the weight of two uranium halves 
which propelled together could start a nuclear explosion. One 
physicist experimented for months moving them together with a 
screwdriver. One day, the screwdriver slipped. An eerie blue light 
filled the whole laboratory. Only half a second stood between the 
disappearance of Los Alamos and possibly a change in world history. 
The laboratory was saved. The physic~t died. He had a phrase for 
what he had been doing. He called it "twisting the tail of the 
dragon". I sometimes have the feeling that this is what we are 
doing in the trade field. I lived through the years in the 1930s 
as a schoolboy and the early 1940s as a young soldier when the 
dragons had been wakened. I do not want to see the dragons wakened 
again. So, twisting their tail seems to me a high risk occupation. 
And there is, I would suggest, a third consideration. 
It is no bad thing from time to time to stand back and look at 
what history will be saying about us in 20 years time. And history 
will surely regard these quarrels we are having across the Atlantic 
as something difficult to understand. A lot of attention is being 
devoted here to the dangers which the Soviet Union represents for 
the free world. Yet, here is the Soviet empire going through its 
worst and most ramshackle moments since the October Revolution. 
Unrest and shortages in some Eastern bloc countries, a fourth 
failure in a row of the Soviet grain crop. And yet, this is the 
moment we -- on both sides of the Atlantic -- have chosen to 
attack each other. Does not a divided West risk great dangers ? 
The nations who bore arms a generation ago in defence of liberty 
and who stand ready to do so again need each other far more than 
they need to quarrel. 
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So all this is an argument not for sweeping our differences 
under the carpet but for seeing sometimes by open discussion, some-
times by discreet bilateral exploration what accommodation we can 
find. If not, history will judge us harshly. And history will be 
right. 
Mr. ~~or. Part of a diplomat's job is to listen and 
I shall be doing a lot of that over the next few months and years. 
But it is also a diplomat's job to tell the tale as he and his 
clients see it. So I should like to thank you for your courtesy 
in listening to me today and to say that I look forward very much 
to my stay in a fascinating city and a great country. 

